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Two divergent lines of cases emerged in the Federal Circuit in the wake of
Markman v. Westview Instruments1 on the proper methodology to use for defining

disputed terms of patent claims. Many of these opinions purported to be consistent with

Federal Circuit precedent, yet obvious inconsistencies appeared, causing much

uncertainty for patent litigators and prosecutors. The dispute focused on whether a trial

court should primarily consider intrinsic evidence – the claims, the specification, and the

prosecution history – or extrinsic evidence – mainly general use and technical

dictionaries and treatises – to properly construe terms found in patent claims.

On July 21, 2004, the Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Phillips v.
AWH Corp.2 in part to resolve this claim construction conflict. Ultimately, the court

issued a new opinion on July 12, 2005, that held that intrinsic evidence must be the
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primary source for construing patent claims. The court further reasoned that while

extrinsic evidence may be consulted to assist the court in understanding a particular

technology, it must be afforded its appropriate weight – subordinate to all of the intrinsic

evidence. Although the Federal Circuit in Phillips provided practitioners guidance on

which to base future claim construction attempts, it admittedly constructed a loose

framework designed to be applied on a case-by- case basis.

After Phillips, claim construction jurisprudence remains in disarray as the Federal

Circuit appears to be applying different parts of its Phillips ruling in different cases. The

effects of the holding in this case will not be totally clear for some time, as evidenced by

the convoluted holdings being handed down post-Phillips. To be successful under the

current case law, patent litigators must master a comprehensive understanding of Phillips

and keep abreast of pending decisions applying Phillips. Furthermore, patent prosecutors

must write precise specifications, focusing on the consistent use of terms between the

claims and the remainder of the specification. Although the court may have disappointed

many observers when it refused to provide clear guidelines for claim construction in

Phillips, the case’s legacy will be defined more by what it failed to say rather than by its
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explicit holdings. The days of the dictionary presumption are over, but where claim

construction goes from there remains unclear.

I. Phillips I – A Bird that Didn’t Fly
In its order granting rehearing en banc in the initial Phillips case, the Federal
Circuit vacated its previous judgment entered April 8, 20043 and withdrew the opinion of

the first panel that affirmed the grant of summary judgment after a claim construction
hearing.4 In the Federal Circuit’s order, the majority invited the parties to file additional
briefing and any other interested parties to file amicus curiae briefs on seven questions.5

Many of the court’s questions focused on the proper weight to assign to different types of
evidence used in claim construction.6

In the en banc Phillips case, the majority held that intrinsic evidence consisting of

the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history must be given
greatest weight in claim construction.7 Further, the majority stated that dictionaries and

other extrinsic evidence may be consulted to assist the court in understanding a particular
technology.8 The court settled upon loosely structured claim construction rules, focusing
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mainly upon affording each type of evidence its appropriate weight.9 The majority
expressly reaffirmed its decision in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.10, which held

that intrinsic evidence is to be consulted first to construe the claims and that extrinsic

evidence is to be used only if the intrinsic evidence fails to provide an adequate definition

of a claim term or merely to assist the court in understanding the technology in
question.11

The en banc court openly criticized the claim construction methodology presented
in Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.12 The court explained that “the methodology

[Texas Digital] adopted placed too much reliance on extrinsic sources such as
dictionaries…and too little on intrinsic sources.”13 The court acknowledged that looking

to intrinsic evidence first may lead a court to mistakenly read limitations from the

specification into the claims, but expressed confidence in the district courts to properly
perform that task.14

The facts of Phillips allowed the issue of the proper methodology to use for claim

construction to be squarely presented. Edward H. Phillips invented vandalism-resistant
panels that may be welded together to form walls capable of fire and noise insulation.15
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After obtaining a patent on the invention, Mr. Phillips disclosed his invention to AWH

Corporation, Hopeman Brothers, Inc. and Lofton Corporation (collectively hereinafter
“AWH”) and agreed to allow AWH to make and sell the products.16 This agreement
ended in 1990.17 In 1991, Mr. Phillips came across AWH advertising indicating that
AWH continued to make and sell his invention without his consent.18 After failed

negotiations, Mr. Phillips filed suit against AWH in 1997 alleging in pertinent part that
AWH infringed his patent.19 After determining that the claims at issue contained

“means-plus-function” language, the trial court considered the disclosures in the

specification that corresponded to the “structure, material, or acts” as required under 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.20 The trial court concluded that the specification failed to disclose
baffles found within the wall that were placed at a 90° angle.21 Moreover, the
specification referred to baffles placed at any angle other than 90°.22 Upon ruling that the

scope of the claims at issue failed to include baffles placed at a 90° angle, the trial court
granted AWH’s motion for summary judgment.23

II. Claim Construction Before Phillips – Clear as Mud
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Before Phillips was redecided in July of 2005, two distinct claim construction
methodologies had evolved24: the so-called “dictionary disciples”25 and those abiding by
the “specification über alles” rule.26 The “dictionary disciples” support defining claim

terms primarily by referencing a dictionary, as long as the dictionary definition is not
inconsistent with the specification.27 In contrast, those advocating the “specification über

alles” rule maintain that the trial court must first consult the intrinsic evidence of a patent.

Only upon failure to find a definition from the intrinsic evidence, may the court consider
extrinsic evidence to help define a claim term.28 Many Federal Circuit cases construed

claims by one methodology or the other. And while such opinions expressly

acknowledged the conflict between the two, they failed to definitively resolve the

conflict, thereby leaving the door open for a different panel to further tweak the already-

murky rule.
For example, in Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni29, the Federal

Circuit recognized two classic claim construction canons, “(a) one may not read a

limitation into a claim from the written description, but (b) one may look to the written

description to define a term already in a claim limitation.” The Renishaw court heralded
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these canons as being “at the core of claim construction methodology…provid[ing]
guideposts for a spectrum of claim construction problems.”30 The court quoted with

approval from a 1958 CCPA case that “indiscriminate reliance on definitions found in

dictionaries can often produce absurd results,” and further stated that “where there are

several common meanings for a claim term, the patent disclosure serves to point away
from the improper meanings and toward the proper meaning.”31 Similarly, in
Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc.32, the Federal Circuit held that

“extrinsic evidence…is useful insofar as it ‘can shed useful light on the relevant art – and

thus better allow a court to place itself in the shoes of a person of ordinary skill in the art’
reading the claims alongside the rest of the specification.”33 The Astrazeneca court

acknowledged that some of the Federal Circuit’s recent cases “suggest[ed] that the

intrinsic record…should be consulted only after the ordinary and customary meaning of

claim terms…is determined” and cited a “presumption in favor of a dictionary
definition.”34 (emphasis added).

Other cases leaned more directly toward one methodology over the other. In
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V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SPA35, the Federal Circuit held that the “intrinsic

record…is [the] primary tool to supply context for interpretation of disputed claim

terms…to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” On the other hand,
in Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc.36, the court held that “dictionaries are often

helpful in ascertaining the plain and ordinary meaning of claim language.”

In 2002, the Federal Circuit decided Texas Digital, which attracted much attention
and established itself as the seminal case for the “dictionary disciples.”37 The court stated

that the terms of a claim “bear a ‘heavy presumption’” that the definition intended in the

claim is consistent with the ordinary meaning to a skilled person in the art and the trial

court should give a claim term such a meaning unless the presumption is properly

rebutted, regardless of whether the dictionary definitions have been offered into
evidence.38 The court acknowledged that dictionaries may be one of “the most

meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding…the
technology.”39 The court further reasoned that the intrinsic evidence relating to the patent

should be examined, but only to determine whether it rebuts the presumption in favor of
the dictionary meaning.40 The court concluded that a dictionary definition may only be
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rebutted where intrinsic evidence clearly uses words that are inconsistent with the
ordinary meaning of the claim term found by consulting a dictionary.41

Roughly two years after Texas Digital, the Federal Circuit again changed its spots
when it decided C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.42, which held that “extrinsic

evidence cannot alter any claim meaning discernible from intrinsic evidence.” The court

credited a long line of precedent indicating that “the intrinsic record is the primary source
for determining claim meaning.”43 In criticizing the plaintiff’s argument that Texas

Digital “held” that dictionaries should primarily be consulted when construing claim

terms, the court stated that the Texas Digital court merely “advised” that such a method
would be preferred.44 However, this court also failed to clearly state the basis upon

which C.R. Bard was decided and can possibly be considered dicta itself. Rather

interestingly, the C.R. Bard court noted that the claim construction issue might soon be
resolved by the grant of an en banc rehearing in the Phillips case.45

Many practitioners conclude that the lack of consistency from the Federal Circuit

on claim construction methodology pre-Phillips was a function of the ever-changing
panels of judges assigned to a particular case.46 As a result of the obvious disagreement
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over the proper method to interpret claim terms by members of the Federal Circuit, many

observers anxiously awaited claim construction guidance from Phillips that might yield
some certainty.47 Some even heralded Phillips as the most important patent case of the
decade.48

III. Has the Federal Circuit Merely Rearranged the Furniture?
The consequences of Phillips were anticipated to be grand, yet they failed to meet

the expectations of those who hoped for a monumental change in claim construction
jurisprudence.49 Rather, Phillips signified a departure from the “experiment”50 the
Federal Circuit was conducting that was marked by its decision in Texas Digital.51 Since

Phillips, the Federal Circuit has revisited claim construction issues several times,
resulting in varying outcomes. In Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc.52, decided only two months

after the Phillips decision, the Federal Circuit granted rehearing for “the limited purpose

of addressing the effects of Phillips.” Only two days after Nystrom, the Federal Circuit
again tested its holding in Phillips in Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Intern., Inc.53

This time the court incorporated a dictionary definition into the claim construction
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analysis while claiming to follow the Phillips rule merely by stating that the specification

comported with the dictionary’s definition of the disputed claim term. Ultimately, claim

construction methodology remains uncertain and unresolved post-Phillips.

A. Is Phillips Making a Name for Itself?

The Federal Circuit granted rehearing in Nystrom as a result of its holding in
Phillips.54 The court withdrew its pre-Phillips opinion in Nystrom and affirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.55 In its withdrawn 2004

opinion, the Nystrom court claimed that the district court “erroneously construed certain

claim limitations” when it defined the terms at issue by following the Texas Digital
methodology.56 The court reasoned that in the absence of a clear definition or disavowal

of a meaning in the disclosure, a term must be interpreted from the perspective of a
person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the filing of the application.57 The

perspective of the ordinary skilled artisan may be found by “reviewing a variety of

sources, including the claims themselves; dictionaries and treatises; and the written
description, drawings, and prosecution history.”58 (emphasis added). These statements
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imply that dictionaries are higher in priority than the specification for purposes of claim
construction.59

Upon reconsideration of Nystrom post-Phillips, the Federal Circuit reversed its

claim construction ruling, holding that a claim term must be interpreted in “light of the
entire intrinsic record.”60 The court further noted that the “construction that stays true to

the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the
invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.”61 However, the court also noted
that “resort to dictionaries may be helpful.”62 The court stated that “[w]hat Phillips now

counsels is that in the absence of something in the written description or the prosecution

history…that the inventor intended a disputed term to cover more than the ordinary and

customary meaning revealed…[in] the intrinsic records, it is improper to read the term to

encompass a broader definition simply because it may be found in a dictionary, treatise,
or other extrinsic source.”63 In lieu of further explanation of Phillips, the court in

Nystrom merely applied the principles already established in Phillips and reiterated its
policies.64
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After Nystrom appeared to reaffirm Phillips, the Federal Circuit decided Free

Motion Fitness in which the court construed the definition of the word “adjacent” by

relying heavily on a dictionary definition. The court began by announcing its adherence

to the claim construction methodology presented in Phillips, yet concluded without

explanation that the term “adjacent” was not defined in the intrinsic evidence or the
relevant art and so resorted to a dictionary.65 The court focused its Phillips-based

analysis on the freedom to incorporate dictionary definitions into claim construction and

even pointed out that a court may afford a term the full breadth of its ordinary meaning,

while presumptively receiving “its broadest dictionary definition or the aggregate of
multiple dictionary definitions.”66 The court settled on the meaning of “adjacent” to be
“not distant.”67 In reaching this construction, the court merely referred to the

specification to make sure the dictionary definition did not contradict the one found in the
specification.68 While the Free Motion Fitness court mentioned the Phillips

methodology, it did not actually apply that methodology.

69

Since Phillips, the Federal Circuit appears to have selected portions of the Phillips

claim construction methodology to conduct its analysis. On occasion, the court
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emphasizes that “the specification necessarily informs the proper construction of the

claims” and that it is “appropriate for the court…to rely heavily on the written description
for guidance as to the meaning of claims.”70 (emphasis added). It has even criticized

parties for failing to rely upon definitions that may be found within the intrinsic
evidence.71 In other instances, the court has held that dictionaries may be used to help

define claim terms if given proper weight, but that intrinsic evidence is of “central
importance” and therefore must be consulted first.72 On the other hand, the Federal

Circuit has criticized a trial court for improperly importing limitations from the

specification into the claims, thereby restricting the claims’ scope to coverage of a single
embodiment.73 In early January of 2006, the majority opinion in nCube Corp v.
Seachange Intern., Inc.74 did not even cite Phillips. The dissent noted that fact and itself

relied on Phillips to support the dissenting opinion, quoting from Phillips “the

specification is always highly relevant to…claim construction…[and is] usually
dispositive.”75
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B. The Bottom Line

At this point, practitioners may be wondering what practical information may be

extracted from Phillips and its progeny of a handful of cases. The Phillips majority

opinion failed to completely clarify claim construction methodology and claim
construction still appears to be approached by the court on a case-by- case basis.76 The

specification remains crucial and must be carefully written because it apparently will be

the focus of any claim construction. One thing that is clear is that the previous

presumption in favor of dictionary definitions has been jettisoned. Therefore

practitioners should carefully use terms consistently in the specification and claims.

Ideally, patent prosecutors would properly anticipate the points of novelty in the

invention before filing so that they may properly define claim terms as intended in the

specification. Prosecutors may wish to consider referring to technical or general use

dictionaries when choosing language to describe elements of the invention. Additionally,

use of such phrases as “the present invention” or “the preferred embodiment” in the

application might best be replaced by “an embodiment,” which is likely to be deemed

less restrictive in the context of a litigation. Many prosecutors may cringe at the thought
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of providing explicit definitions of claim terms because they wish to provide litigators

with some flexibility for interpretation of the terms in the future.

Claim construction jurisprudence continues to “percolate,” although recent panel

decisions post-Phillips do seem to have fewer dissenting opinions. In patents today, it is

crucial that both prosecutors and litigators have a comprehensive working knowledge of

Phillips and its progeny. Definitions of claim terms advocated by trial attorneys ideally

will be a nicely meshed hybrid of the definition ascertainable from intrinsic evidence and

that gleaned from extrinsic evidence such as a dictionary. And the trial attorney’s job can

be made much easier if the patent drafter puts careful thought into crafting a patent

application that applies the Phillips and post-Phillips principles.

1

Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Markman held that claim construction is a

question of law for the court to decide, affording such rulings de novo review by the Federal Circuit on

appeal.
2

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 71 USPQ2d 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1765.

3

Ibid.

16

4

Ibid. The first panel consisted of Judges Newman, Lourie, and Dyk, in which Judge Lourie wrote for the

majority and Judge Dyk dissented. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 70 U.S.P.Q.2d

1417.
5

For a complete list of the seven questions presented by the court, see Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1382-83. In a

concurring opinion granting the order, Judge Radar presented an additional question asking whether the

court should adopt a “strictly algorithmic” set of rules for claim construction analysis. Phillips, 376 F.3d at

1384. Chief Judge Mayer dissented from the majority decision to grant the order for rehearing en banc,

stating that efforts to “refine the process” of claim construction would be futile until the court is willing to

reconsider its opinion in Markman. Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1384 (holding that the Federal Circuit retains the

right to review claim construction rulings de novo).
6

Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1383-84.

7

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316-1319.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573.

11

Id. at 1312.

12

Id. at 1319-24, Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), 64 U.S.P.Q.2d

1812.
13

Id. at 1320.

17

14

Id. at 1323.

15

Id. at 1309.

16

Id. Mr. Phillips obtained U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 on his panels that were at issue in this case. Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id. Mr. Phillips’ suit included a claim for trade secret misappropriation that the court held was barred by

the statute of limitations. Id.
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2005), petition

for rehearing en banc denied, 405 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641.
25

Darryl Woo, et. al, Phillips v. AWH Corporation – Revisiting the Rules of Claim Construction: Still No

Magic Formula, July 13, 2005, at

http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/Litigation/Litigation_Alert_07-13-05.pdf (last visited Jan.

31, 2006).
26

Merck, 395 F.3d at 1377-78.

27

Id.

18

28

Id., Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott Lab., 375 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 71 U.S.P.Q.2d

1650, Vitronics, 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
29

Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998), 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1117.

30

Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1248.

31

Id. at 1250.

32

Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 384 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 72 U.S.P.Q.2d

1726.
33

Id. at 1337.

34

Astrazeneca, 384 F.3d at 1337.

35

V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Group SPA, 401 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1042.

36

Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865.

37

See generally Texas Digital, 308 F.3d 1193.

38

Texas Digital, 308 F.3d 1202-03.

39

Id. at 1203.

40

Id. at 1204.

41

Id.

42

C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011.

43

Id. at 862.

19

44

Id. The court explained that “the holding in Texas Digital was much narrower than that to which the

plaintiff alluded in the sense that dictionaries were only used to construe two of the nine claim terms at

issue, in which the dictionary was consistent with the term as defined in the intrinsic evidence.” Id.
45

Id. at 863.

46

Sam Mamundi, Federal Circuit rules against dictionary use, Jul. 1, 2005, at

http://www.managingip.com/includes/news/PRINT.asp?SID=525656&ISS-17456 (last visited Jan. 31,

2006). When the U.S. Congress commissioned the formation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, one of its

main articulated purposes was to bring consistency to patent law. The U.S. Court of Appeals and the

Federal Judiciary, at http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/ca_bdy?OpenDocument&Click= (last

visited Jan. 31, 2006). Twelve circuit judges are active members of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1997). A

panel for a usual case consists of three active judges. United States court of appeals, at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_court_of_appeals (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
47

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330 (Mayer, J. dissenting), Lee Gesmer, et. al, Federal Circuit Case Addresses

Patent Interpretation, Jul. 2005, at http://www.gesmer.com/advisory/072005.php (last visited Jan. 31,

2006). The Federal Circuit reverses claim construction rulings at an astounding rate – with estimates

topping 40%. Gregory A. Castanias, et. al, Petition for Certiorari Filed In AWH Corp. v. Phillips, Dec.

2005, at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubIP=S2973, Re-Examining Patent

Interpretation: Too Little, Too Late?, at http://library.findlaw.com/2005/Jan/17/133683.html (last visited

Jan. 31, 2006). A Federal Circuit en banc panel consists of all twelve of its active judges. United States

20

court of appeals, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_court_of_appeals (last visited Jan. 31,

2006).
48

Lee Gesmer, et. al, Federal Circuit Case Addresses Patent Interpretation, Jul. 2005, at

http://www.gesmer.com/advisory/072005.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
49

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330 (Mayer, J. dissenting).

50

Professor Joseph S. Miller described the Texas Digital line of cases as “an experiment.” Professor Miller

co-authored an amicus brief to the Federal Circuit in Phillips. He was kind enough to share his thoughts on

the case and other pertinent issues with me.
51

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303.

52

Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc., 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481.

53

Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Intern., Inc., 423 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1432.

54

Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1138.

55

Id.

56

Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc., 374 F.3d 1105, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004), opinion currently withdrawn. The term

at issue was the word “board” and whether it would be limited to wood boards cut from a log. Id. at 1110-

11. The specification failed to disclose a board that was not made of wood cut from a log. Id. One

dictionary definition included boards made of synthetic materials in addition to those cut from a log. Id.
57

Id. at 1111.

58

Id.

21

59

Typically, when a district court has first consulted a dictionary, a term’s interpretation is broader than if

the court primarily considered the specification. Under the Texas Digital line of cases, courts allowed

parties to present evidence of dictionary definitions that encompassed a multitude of claim term

interpretations so long as none of it obviously contradicted the disclosure. Nystrom, 424 F.3d 1145.
60

Id. at 1142.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 1145.

64

See generally Nystrom, 424 F.3d 1136.

65

Free Motion Fitness, 423 F.3d at 1347-48.

66

Id. at 1348-49.

67

Id. at 1349.

68

Id.

69

See generally Free Motion Fitness, 423 F.3d 1343.

70

Network Commerce, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 422 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1330

(To construe the claims at issue, the court repeatedly referred to the specification to ascertain the meaning

of the claim terms).
71

Id.

22

72

See Aquatex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 76 U.S.P.Q.2d

1213; Terlep v. Brinkman Corp., 418 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1053.
73

Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1041.

74

nCube Corp v. Seachange Intern., Inc., No. 03-1341, 03-1366, 2006 WL 39053 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2006).

75

Id.

76

Dennis Crouch, En Banc Federal Circuit Changes The Law of Claim Construction, July 13, 2005, at

http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/07/en_banc_federal.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).

23

